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Supply Shocks, Wage Indexation
and Monetary Accommodation
ABSTRACT
This paper develops a unified framework for the analysis of wage
indexation and monetary policy in the presence of supply shocks. We first
present simple formulae for the optimal wage indexation rule and for the
optimal money supply rule. In order to set the stage for an evaluation of
departures from the optimal policy rules we first analyse two extreme cases
——arule that stabilizes employment and a rule that stabilizes the real
wage. The analysis of these two extreme cases provides the ingredients for
the evaluation of various rules for wage indexation and for monetary
targeting. We examine the implications of indexing wages to (1) nominal
GNP, (ii) the DPI and (iii) the value—added price index, as well as the
implications of targeting the money supply to these alternative three indi-
cators. It is shown that, the various indexation rules bear a dual relation
to the various monetary targeting rules. The welfare ranking of the
various rules depends on whether the elasticity of the demand for labor
exceeds or falls short of the elasticity of labor supply. If the demand
for labor is more elastic than the supply, then policy rules that stabilize
employment produce a smaller welfare cost than policy rules that stabilize
the real wage. In that case, indexing wages to nominal GNP results in a
smaller welfare cost than indexing to value—added price index which, in turn,
produces a smaller cost than indexation to the CPI. Because of the dual
relation between monetary policy and wage indexation, it follows that under
the same circumstances, monetary policy that targets nominal GNP produces a
smaller welfare cost than policy that targets the value—added price index
which, in turn, results in a smaller cost than the policy that targets the
CPI. This ranking is reversed when the elasticity of the supply of labor
exceeds the elasticity of demand.
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(312)962—1260 (312)962—8253The energy crises of the 1970's stimulated a renewed interest in
questions concerning the proper adjustment to external supply shocks. In
general, restoration of equilibrium in response to shocks necessitates
adjustment of both quantities and prices. When applied to labor markets,
various proposals for policy rules attempting to restore labor-market
equilibrium may be classified in terms of their impact on the division of
adjustment between quantities (the level of employment) and prices (the real
wage). The design of' optimal policies provides for the appropriate division
of this adjustment.
This paper develops a unified framework for the analysis of wage
indexation and monetary policy. The analytical framework is applied to
determine the optimal policy rules in the presence of supply shocks as well
as to evaluate the welfare consequences and ranking of alternative (sub—
optimal) policy rules. In order to set the stage for an evaluation of the
welfare implications of alternative policy rules, we first analyse two
extreme cases ——arule that stabilizes employment and a rule that stabi-
lizes the real wage. The analysis of these two extreme cases provides the
ingredients for the evaluation of various rules for wage-indexation and for
monetary targeting .Weexamine the implications of indexing wages to (1)
nominal GNP, (Ii) the CPI and (iii) the value-added price index. The
distinction between the CPI and the value—added price index is of a special
importance in the presence of supply shocks. We also examine the implica-
tions of targeting the money supply to these alternative three indicators.
Our analysis demonstrates that, on the formal level, the various
iridexation rules bear a dual relation to the various monetary targeting
rules. We show that the welfare ranking of the various rules depends on
whether the elasticity of the demand for labor exceeds or falls short of the
elasticity of labor supply. Specifically, if the demand for labor is more2
elasticthan the supply, then policy rules that stabilize employment produce
a smaller welfare cost than policy rules that stabilize the real wage and
vice—versa. Accordingly, using this principle, we show that if the elastic-
ity of the demand for labor exceeds the elasticity of supply then, indexing
wages to nominal GNP results in a smaller welfare cost than indexing to the
value—added price index which, in turn, produces a smaller cost than indexa—
tion to the CPI. Likewise, because of the dual relation between monetary
policy and wage indexation, it follows that under the same circumstances,
monetary policy that targets nominal GNP produces a smaller welfare cost
than policy that targets the value—added price index which, in turn, results
in a smaller cost than the policy that targets the CPI. This ranking is
reversed when the elasticity of the supply of labor exceeds the elasticity
of demand.
Our analysis is of relevance to both the theory and the policy
discussions concerning wage indexation and monetary rules. Specifically,
great attention has been given to the question of whetherthe monetary
authority, when faced with a higher price of imported energy, shouldfollow
an accommodative policy and expand the money supply in orderto "finance"
the higher energy price or, whether it should be anti—accommodative and
contract the money supply in order to lower inflation. The key question was
whether, in the absence of an active monetary response, labor markets can
adjust without costly deviations from full employment [e.g. Gordon (1975,
198Ls), Phelps (1978), Blinder (1981), Rasche and Tatom (1981) and Fischer
(1985)]. Our analysis deals with these questions as part of the more
general analytical framework.
Section I describes the building blocks of the model including the
specification of the stochastic shocks and the determination of outputand
employment. Section II introduces the objective function whichaims at
minimizing the expected value of labor—market distortions. In our model, as
in Gray (1976) and Fischer (1977a, 1977c), the need for wage-indexation and3
monetary policy arises from the existence of labor-market contracts accord-
ing to which wages are set in advance of the realization of the stochastic
shocks. This labor-market convention results in some stickiness of wages.
Wage indexation and monetary policies intend to reduce the undesirable
consequences of this stickiness. With the aid of' the objective function we
derive the optimal wage inclexation rule which eliminates the welfare cost.
The key characteristic of the optimal indexation rule is that it separates
betweenthe effects of monetary and real shocks on the wage.
In Section III we examine the implications of departures from the
optimal indexation rule. In this context we develop a generalcriterion for
the comparisons between rules that. stabilize employment and rules that
stabilize real wages. We then apply this criterion to determine the welfare
ranking of alternative proposals for wage indexation rules.
The question of monetary accommodation is addressed in section IV.
We start by specifying the conditions for monetary equilibrium. We then
determine the optimal money—supply rule and analyse its dependence on Ci)
the nature of the stochastic shocks (ii) the parameters of the demand for
money, (iii) the elasticities of the demand for and supply of labor, and
(iv) the degree of' wage indexation. The section concludes with an analysis
of various targeting rules for monetary policies. Analogously to the com-
parisons among wage—indexation rules, the monetary rules are analysed in
terms of their relative impact on stabilizing quantities (employment) versus
stabilizing prices (the real wage). Finally, section V contains concluding
remarks.14
I.The Model
In this section we outline the structure of the model which includes
a specification of the productive technology, and a determination of the
levels of output, employment and wages.
1.1 Output and Employment
Output is assumed to be produced by a Cobb-Douglas production tune—
tion using labor and. imported energy as variable inputs. Thus, for period
(1) log I =logB +8logLt +Alog Vt + , O<<1,O<A<1
where denotes the level of output, and V denote, respectively,
the inputs of labor and energy, B denotes a parameter including all fixed
factors of production and denotes a productivity shock. The produc-
tivity shock is assumed to be distributed independently and normally with a
zero mean and a known variance .incompetitive equilibrium the para-
meters and A denote, respectively, the relative shares of labor income
and energy bill in national product. Throughout the analysis we assume that
information is complete; thus, producers and other agents in the economy
know the realized values of the stochastic shocks.
Producers, who are assumed to maximize profits, demand labor and
energy so as to equate the real wage and the relative price of energy to the
marginal products of labor and energy. Expressed logarithmically, these
equalities are
(2) lo() =logB —(1—)logLt +Alog Vt +5
p
(3)log)log AB +log Lt —(1—A)logVt
where ,Pand P denote the nominal wage, the nominal price of energy
and the price level, respectively.
Equations (1)—(3) characterize the levels of output and factor
inputs for a given realization of the stochastic productivity shock
In the absence of stochastics shocks, the corresponding levels of output and
factor inputs are denoted by I. L and V and the corresponding real
factor prices are (W/P)0 and (PIP). For subsequent use we denote by
lower case letters the percentage discrepancy of a variable from the value
obtained in the absence of shocks. Thus, x =logX —logX. Accordingly,
the percentage deviation of output from its non—stochastic level is
(1') y = + +
whereylog log 9.logL-lo L, and v =logV-lo V0.
Analogously, subtracting from equations (2)and(3)thecorresponding equa-
tions for the non—stochastic equilibrium yields
(2') w—p =—(i—b)P.+Ày+ii
— (1—A)v+
where,for simplicity, the time subscript has been omitted. From equations
(2' )and(3') thedemands for labor and energy (or more precisely the per-
centage discrepancy of the demands for labor and energy from their non—
stochastic levels) are6
(i4) 2.=ci[(1—A)(p—w) +
(5) V — (l—t)(PP)+
whereo=
1 —p—A
Assuming that producers are always able to satisfy their demands for labor
and energy inputs, we substitute equations (i4)and(5) into (1') and obtain
(6) ya[(p-w) —A(p—p)+
Equation(6), which may be viewed as the aggregate supply function, shows
that the percentage deviation of output from its deterministic level depends
on the percentage deviations of the real wage and of the relative price of
energy from their deterministic levels, as well as on the real productivity
shock Highervalues of the real wage anu of the real energy price oper-
ate like neatlve supply shocks and result in lower output, whereas a posi-
tive productivity shock raises output.
We assume that the economy is small in the world energy market and
thatitfaces an exogenously given energy price wliich is distributed nor-
mally around a given mean. In order to simplify the notations we define an
effective real shock u as the sum of the positive supply shocks arising
from shocks to productivity and to the price of imported energy, Thus
u —A(p—p).Withthis definition of the effective real shock, the
demand for labor in equation ()andthe supply of output in equation (6)
can be written as:
p4') 2. n(p-w) +au7
and
(6') y —a[8(p—w)+u]
where =a(1-A) denotes the (absolute value of the) elasticity of the
demand for labor with respect to the real wage. This specification of
employment and output (ormoreprecisely the percentage discrepancy of
employment and output from their non-stochastic levels) reflects the assump-
tion that 9.andy are determined exclusively by the demand for labor rather
than by the interaction between the demand and the supply of labor.2 The
resultant disequilibrium in the labor market induces welfare cost and our
subsequent analysis deals with ways to minimize this welfare cost. In order
to obtain a benchmark for the assessment of the implications of distortions
in the labor market, we turn first to an analysis of the equilibrium that
would have obtained in the absence of distortions.
1.2 The Undistorted Equilibrium
In the undistorted equilibrium the demand for labor equals the
supply. Let the supply of labor be
S w (7) log Ltlog A +clog()
where denotes the elasticity of labor supply. As before, using lower-
case letters to denote the percentage deviation of labor supply from the
non-stochastic level, we obtain
(7') 9S—c(w—p)8
Equating the demand for labor (equation (u'))withthe supply (equation
(7')) yields the undistored equilibrium employment, £, and the undistorted
equilibrium real wages, (w—p);
(8) Efl
(9)()
Usingequation (9)in(6') yields the undistorted equilibrium output y
—(1i)
(10) y = u
When this equilibrium obtains, the demand for labor equals the supply of
labor arid, in the absence of other distortions, efficiency is maximized.
II. The Measure of Welfare Loss and Optimal Indexation
Inc foregoing analysis determined the equilibrium undistorted levels
of output, employment and real wages. It was assumed that the flexibility
of wages and prices yielded an undistorted labor market equilibrium. The
values of the key variables in the undistorted equilibrium serve as the
benchmark against which the actual levels of output, employment ani real
wages can be compared. Such comparisons provide the basis for the computa-
tion of the welfare loss of labor market distortions. In this section we
outline a measure of the welfare loss and we discuss the optimal policies
designed to eliminate this loss. A more formal derivation of the measure of
welfare loss is presented in the Appendix.9
11.1 The Welfare Loss
It is assumed that due to costs of negotiations nominal wages are
Set In advance at their expected market clearing level, and employment is
determined by the demand for labor. For a given realization of the effec-
tive real shock, u, the resulting level of employment is9., as given by
equation (4'). The corresponding equilibrium level of employment is2., as
given by equation (4''), obtained by substituting into (4') the equilibrium
real wage (w-p) for the actual real wage.
(14'') 9. =n(p-w)+ou
The discrepancy between 9. and 2.is responsible for the welfare loss. That
discrepancy is
(11) 9. —2.=nL—(WP)+(w—p)}
In order to compute the welfare loss associated with this discrepancy we
need to multiply it by one half of the difference between the demand and the
Supply prices at the actual level of employment.Diagramatically, in
Figure 1£ and (W:p) designate the equilibrium values of employment and
real wages, whereas9.. designates actual employment. At the actual employ-
ment level, 9.,thedemand price for labor, (w—p), exceeds the correspond-
ing supply price, (w-p)5. The welfare loss is represented by measuring
the area of the triangle ABC. This triangle expresses the welfare loss in









By using the definitions of the elasticities of the demand and the supply of
labor we note that (w_p)d -(w—p)5=(! + J) ( — 9). Substitutinginto
(12) and recalling that the equilibrium real wage, (W:p), is specified by
equation (9), yields
1 c+n o 2
(13)
Equation (13) measures the area of the triangle ABC in Figure 1. In what
follows we assume that the objective of policy is to minimize the expected
value of the welfare loss, and we denote the loss function by H where
As is evident by inspection of (13), a policy that is capable of
generating a real wage w-p that is equal to the equilibrium wage
au/(+), will eliminate the welfare loss. In wh.. follows we determine the
optimal wage-indexation formula that eliminate the welfare loss. We then
use the loss function to evaluate the welfare implications of alternative
formulae for wage indexation and for money supply rules.
11.2 Optimal Wage Indexation
As was already indicated it is assumed that due to cost of nego-
tiations nominal wages are set in advance and are adjusted over time accord-
ing to a simple, time—invariant indexation rule. Let the indexation rule be
(1L) log =logW +b0(logI' -logP0) +b1u
Equation (114) specifies the wage at period t as a function of (i) W0, the
equilibrium wage that is obtained in the absence of shocks,14 (ii) the per—
centage deviation of the price from its non—stochastic equilibrium, and11
(iii) the effective real shock u. Expressing the wage rule in terms of
lower-case letters, recalling that the effective real shock is composed of
productivity and energy—price shocks, i.e., u=i—Aq, and allowing for dif-
ferent coefficients of indexation to iaridq,yields
(15) wb0 p +b1i+ b2q
Equation (15) specifies an iridexation rule by which the nominal wage adjusts
in response to the price, p, to the productivity shock, .i,andto the
energy-price shock, q. The optimal values of b0, b1 and b2 are chosen so
as to eliminate the discrepancy between actual and equilibrium real wages.
Inspection of the last bracketed term in (13) reveals that the nominal wage
which eliminates the welfare loss is
a Au
wp +—i——q
where —Aq has been substituted for the effective real shock u. Thus, the
optimal values of the coefficients in the indexation rule (15) are:
(16) 1, = , andb2 —Ab1
This formulation of the indexation rule is analogous to that of
Karni (1983) who showed in the context of a closed economy without energy
input that at the optimum the nominal wage must adjust to the price level by
an indexation coefficient of unity whereas, in general, its adjustment to
the productivity shock differs from unity.5
The magnitude of the indexation coefficient b1 depends on the
structure of the economy as reflected by the elasticities of the demand and12
the supply of labor. For example, a lower elasticity of labor supply raises
the absolute values of the optimal coefficients of indexation to the real
shocks (i.e. to productivity shocks and to energy—price shocks). When the
elasticity of the supply of labor approaches zero, b1 approaches
[1/(1—A)J>1, and b2 approaches -A/Cl—A). Likewise, the magnitude of the
coefficients of' indexation to real shocks depend on the relative share of
energy cost in output. As seen in equation (16), a higher share of energy
cost raises b1 as well as the absolute values of b2. In general, b1 will be
positive and b2 will be negative.
The key point to emphasize is that by altering the nominal wage the
optimal indexatiori rule eliminates the welfare loss associated with the
distortion to the real wage. The equilibrium that is obtained with optimal
indexation replicates the equilibrium that would have been obtained if labor
market cleared after the realization of the stochastic shocks. Thereby, the
optimal indexation formula serves to nullify the distortions arising from
the assumption that, because of contracts, nominal wages are predetermined.
Further, if' economic policy was only concerned with the efficiency of
resource allocation then, in the absence of other distortions, once the
optimal indexation formula is adopted there is no need to undertake addi-
tional macroeconomic policies.
The essense of the optimal incjexatiori rule lies in the separation
between the coefficients of indexation to nominal and to real shocks. In
the specification of equation (14), nominal shocks were represented by p
and real shocks were represented by u.it was shown that with optimal
indexation wages should be indexed to p with a coefficient of' unity
whereas the magnitude of the optimal indexation to u depends on the
elasticities of the demand and the supply of labor. Since ultimately the
real shocks are manifested in the realized level of' output, we may also13
include the level of output directly in the indexatlon rule and, thereby,
obtain analternative formulation. The alternative formulation expresses
thewage indexation rule in terms of the response of nominal wages to the
price and to the level of output. Accordingly,
(17)wp +b,y
where bdenotes the coefficient of indexation of nominal wages to real
output. Substituting by for (w-p) in (6') yieldsthe realized value of
y, and equating this realization with the equilibrium value y from
equation (10), yields the optimal indexation coefficient:
y 1+E
Thus,the optimal inciexation rule expressed in terms of prices and output
is:
(17') w =p+!_y.7
Theadvantage of this alternative (but equivalent) formulation is its
simplicity. Here the wage rule is specifiec in terms of the observable
variablespand y about which data are readily available.
ILl. Alternative Wage Iridexation Rules
In the previous section we specified the optimal wage indexation
formula. In this section we apply the analytical framework to an evaluation
of specific proposals for indexation rules including the indexatiori of
nominal wages to nominal income, to the consumer price index (CPI) and to1'4
thedomestic value—added price index.8 In general, restoration of labor
market equilibrium in response to some shocks necessitates some adjustment
of employment and some adjustment of real wages. The optimal indexation
formula provides for the optimal division of the adjustment between changes
in employment and changes in real wages. Tne various proposals which depart
from the optimal indexation rule differ in terms of the allocation of ad-
justment between employment and real wages. In order to evaluate therela-
tive merits and welfare costs of such alternative allocations of adjustment
we start with an analysis of two extreme indexation rules --arule that
stabilizes the real wage and a rule that stabilizes employment. In general,
the various proposals for wage rules involve some combination of the two
extreme rules. Tnerefore, the analysis of the two extreme cases provides
the necessary ingredients for an evaluation of the various proposals.
111.1 Stable Real Wages Versus Stable Employment
Generally,aswas shown before,the expected welfare loss, H ,is
proportional tothe expected squared discrepancy between the actual wage and
the equilibrium real wage:
(18) HaE[—(w—p) + (W:p}2
where a denotes the proportionality factor implied by equation (13).
Consider first the indexation rule that stabilizes the real wage. With this
indexation rule w—p=O. Substituting the equilibrium real wage from equa-
tion (9) into (18) implies that in this case the welfare loss is
a 2 2
(19) at——)15
In equation (19) H indicates that this loss results from the wp
stabilization of real wages. Thus, equation (19) shows the welfare loss
resulting from an indexation rule by which nominal wages are indexed to the
CPI with a coefficient of unity.
Consider next the other extreme indexation rule which stabilizes
employment and thereby ensures that 2.=O.In that case it follows from
equation (4') that. the actual real wage is u/(1—A). Substituting into (18)
implies that with =0 the welfare loss is
U au-2 __________22
(20) H0 =aE{— + — aL(lA)i°
wherethe notation indicates that this welfare loss results from the stabi-
lization of employment.
These two measures of the welfare cost are described diagramatically
in Figure 2. Trie schedules £d and portray the demand and the supply of
labor as specified by equations (4') and (7') in section I. The slopes of
and are —i/riand1/c ,respectively,that is, the slopes are the
inverse of the corresponding elasticities. The initial equilibrium is
described by point 0 at which, the initial demand curve (not drawn)
intersected with the supply. Thus, initially, (w:p)O. The demand schedule
drawn in Figure 2 corresponds to a situation in which there was a positive
realization of the effective real shock, u. As indicated by equation (4'),
this shock induces an upward displacement of the demand schedule by u/(1—A)
and results in a new equilibrium real wage au/(cri) and, correspondingly,
in a new equilibrium level of employment.
Wnen the indexation rule stipulates that real wages must not change








C. In that case the welfare loss is proportional to the area of the 'tri-
angle CEB,and its expected value is as specified by equation (19).
In the other extreme, when the inuexation rule stipulates that employment
must. not change, the level of employment remains at point 0 and the real
wage rises to u/(1—A) at point A. in that case the welfare loss is
proportional to the area of the triangle CAB, and its expected value is
as specified by equation (20). Since the various expressions relate to
percentage deviations from the non—stochastic equilibrium, the actual
welfare loss expressed in units of output is obtained by multiplying (19)
and (20) by the equilibrium non-stochastic wage bill.
In order to determine the relation between the extent of the welfare
losses in the two cases we need to compare the areas of the two triangles
CEB (denoted by )andCAB (denoted by 2• We first note from the
geometry that the two triangles are similar arid that the ratio AD/DO (where
point C inaicates the equilibrium real wage) equals the ratio AB/BC. It
follows, therefore, that the ratio of the two areas 2'1 equals (AD/DO)2.
As seen in Figure 2,





Thus, if the elasticity of labor supply, ,issmaller than the elasticity
of'labordemand, r ,thenan indexatiori rule that fixes employment induces17
a lower welfare loss than an indexation rule that fixes the real wage. Tnis
is the case illustrated in Figure 2. On the other hand if the elasticity of
the supply of labor exceeds the elasticity of the demand,
> ;undersuch circumstances rules which stabilize employment inflict
higher welfare cost than rules which stabilize the real wage.
The preceeding analysis of the two extreme indexation rules provides
the ingredients necessary for the evaluation of various proposals which
combine elements of the two extreme rules. We turn next to examine the
properties of the proposal of linking the nominal wage to nominal income.
111.2 Indexation to Nominal Income
When the nominal wage is indexed to nominal income with a unit
coefficient, wp+y. In this case the coefficients of indexation to the
price arid to real output are both unity. We first note with reference to
equation (17') that as long as the elasticity of the supply of labor, c,
differs from zero, full indexation to nominal income entails welfare loss.
Only when c=O the optimal indexation rule requires that wages be indexed
to nominal income with a coefficient of unity.
In order to evaluate the welfare cost induced by the deaprture from
the optimal indexation rule, we note that with indexation to nominal income,




where the notation in (22) indicates that this wage is obtained under the
rule by which nominal wages are indexed to nominal income with a coefficient18
of unity. With this real wage the level of employment can be read from
equation p4'). Substituting (22) for the real wage in equation (a') shows
that in this case .=Q. Thus, an indexation rule that links the nominal
wage to nominal income through an indexation coefficient of'unityresults in
stable employment. The resulting welfare loss corresponds to the area of




111.3lndexation to the Value—Added Price Index
An alternative proposal which received wide attention especially
following the energy shocks of the 1970's links wages to the domestic value—
added price index. Tnis proposal was analysed recently by Marston and
Turnovsky (1983). In what follows we explore further the implications of
sucn an indexation rule.
Let the price of final output p be a weighted average of the
domestic value-added price index, ,andthe price of imported energy
input p ,andlet the weights correspond to the relative shares of value
added and energy in output. Thus
+Ap
It follows that the domestic value—added price index is
1 A
(2k)19
An indexation rule which links the nominal wage to this index through a
coefficient of unity, sets w=p .Byusing the definition of from
(24), the implied real wage Is
(25) (w-p) =- q
Wpd
where the notation indicates that tnis wage is obtained under the rule by
which nominal wages are indexed Opwith a coefficient of unity. A
comparison between equations (25) and (22) reveals that in the special
easefor which i=0 (so that shocks to the imported energy price constitute
the only component of the effective real shack) then u =—Aqand the
indexation of wages to the domestic value-added price index is equivalent to
the indexation of wages to nominal income. Furthermore, as was shown
before, in this case such indexation results in stable employment and the
corresponding welfare loss is also represented by equations (20).
In the more general case, however, with non—zero productivity shocks
the indexatiori to does not stabilize employment and the welfare loss
differs from the one represented by equations (20). The expression for the
welfare cost in that case is obtained by substituting the equilibrium real





where the notation indicates that this welfare loss results from adopting
the rule by which nominal wages are indexed to d with a coefficient of
unity.20
III.LI Ranking the Indexatiori Rules
The preceeding discussion implies that, in general, the choice
between indexation to nominal income and to the domestic value-added price
index depends on the difference between the expressions measuring the losses
H (In (26)) and H0 (in (20)). In order to facilitate such com-
parison it is useful to rewrite equation (20) somewhat differently by
decomposing the effective real shock into its two components. Thus,
£2-222
(20') H a[ -jj +A o) 9.0 (1—A)(Lfl) q
Since the terms involving the variance of q are identical in both of the
expressions in (26) ana (20'), differences in the welfare cost arise only
from the terms involving the variance of i.Subtracting(20') from (26)
and denoting the difference by D yields
22
(27) D a( -)
[(1-x)( +)j2
Thus, the sign of U depends on whether the elasticity of the demand for
labor exceeds or falls short of the corresponding elasticity of supply.
Since r =(1—A)oexceeds unity (in practice, with typical relative snares,
the magnitude of r is likely to be around 3), and since estimates of the
elasticity of labor supply are typically small, it seems that indexation to
nominal income is likely to be preferable to indexation to the domestic
value—added price index. The opposite holds, however, for cases in which
the elasticity of supply exceeds the elasticity of demand.
A comparison been (20') and (26) shows that when c=0 ,indexa-
tion to nominal income is optimal since in that case the value of the loss21
function in (20') is zero. In contrast, as shown in equation (26), the
welfare loss associated with indexation to the domestic value—added price
index is positive even though c=o. In this case, the expression In (26) is
reduced to a[1/(1—A)j2a2. As argued before, only when the variance of the
productivity shock, i,iszero the two indexation rules yield identical
outcomes.9
In order to gain a broader perspective over the issues involved in
the comparison between the two forms of indexation we note that the condi-
tion determining the sign of D in (27) is the same as the condition deter-
mining whether the cost of indexation rules that stabilize the real wage
exceeds or falls short of the cost of indexation rules that stabilize em-
ployment. These relative costs are reflected in the relative sizes of the
triangles in Figure 2. As shown in equation (21) when the elasticity of the
demand for labor exceeds the elasticity of supply indexation rules that
stabilize employment are preferable to those that stabilize real wages.
Those are also the circumstances under which the indexation of wages to
nominal income is preferable to indexation to the domestic value-added price
index.
The equivalence between the condition under which stable employment
is preferable to stable real wages and the condition under which indexation
to nominal income is preferable to indexation to the value-added price index
is interpreted by reference to equations (22) and (25). When wages are
indexed to the value-added price index then, as seen in equation (25), any
given realization of the productivity shock, ji, doesnot alter the real
wage. Therefore, when the effective real shock consists only of produc-
tivity shocks this rule stabilizes the real wage. On the other hand when
wages are indexed to nominal income then, as seen in equation (22), any
given realization of the productivity shock alters the real wage by22
/(1-A).This change inthereal wage corresponds precisely to the vertical
displacement of the demand for labor arising from the productivity shock
and, therefore, results in stable employment. Finally, as indicated above,
when tne effective real shock consists only of shocks to the price of im-
ported energy then, as seen from equations (22) and (25), the two rules
yield identical outcomes in terms of real wages, employment and welfare.
The following analysis of the various wage indexation rules is
summarized in Table 1 .Init we report the coefficients of indexation to
the price (b), to the productivity shock (b1) and to the energy—price shock
(b2) that are implied by the alternative indexation rules. For example,
when wages are indexed to then, as indicated by the second line of
Table 1 ,such a rule implies an indexation to p with a coefficient b01
and an indexation to q with a coefficient b2 A/(1--A) .Thisrule
follows from equation (25). Likewise, the third line of Table 1 specifies
the coefficients implied by an indexation rule by which nominal wages are
Indexed to nominal income with a coefficient of unity. These coefficients
follow from equation (22). The optimal indexation formula corresponds to
the final line in the Table that follows from equation (16).
Ouranalysis also determined the welfare cost associated with the
various indexation rules. Accordingly, as shown in Table1, if theelas-
ticity of the supply of labor is smaller than the elasticity of the demand,
then the welfare ranking of the alternative rules is
(28) >- Pd>P
where the symbol x)' y indicates that x is prefered to y. Thus, it
follows that under this assumption full indexation to nominal income is
prefered to full indexation to the domestic value—added price index which,TABLE 1
ALTERNATIVE WAGE RULES

















Conclusion: If c<r then the welfare ranking of the
alternative rules is: b >p+y >Pd>P ,andif
c>r then the welfare ranking is
b >pd23
in turn, is prefered to full indexation to theCPI.Of course, the optimal
indexation rule, b ,isprefered to all of the other alternatives. On the
other hand, for cases in which the elasticity of the supply of labor exceeas
tne elasticity of the demand, the welfare ordering of the sub-optimal rules
is reversed. In that case
(28')b> c>
IV. Monetary Equilibrium and Optimal Accommodation
Up to this point the monetary sector has played no explicit role in
the analysis of the wage-indexation rules. Detailed considerations of the
money market could be left in the background since in all the rules that we
have examined, wages were indexed to the CPI with a coefficient of unity.
Furthermore, as shown in Aizenman and Frenkel (1935), the specification of
the model implies that there is a redundancy of policy instruments. There-
fore, in the absence of other distortions, once the optimal indexation rule
is adoptea there is no need to undertake additional macroeconomic policies.
On the other hand it also follows that if wages are not indexed optimally
then there may be room for other policies aiming at the restoration of labor
market equilibrium. In this section we introauce the monetary sector and
analyse the optimal money supply rule.
IV.l The Monetary Sector
In order to determine the equilibrium levels of the nominal quan-
tities like the price level we need to introduce the conditions of money
market equilibrium. Let the demand for money be
(29) log log k +log +clog —24
whereM denotes nominal balances,i denotes the nominal rate of interest
and denotes the (semi) elasticity of the demand for money with respect
to the rate of interest and denotes the income elasticity of the demand.
The domestic price level is assumed to be linked to the foreign price
through purchasing power parity. Thus,
(30) log Ptlog St +log
where S denotes the exchange rate (the price of foreign currency in terms
of domestic currency), and P denotes the foreign price. Let the foreign
price be
(31) log P1 =logF' +
wherea prime (') denotes a foreign variable and where a bar over a variable
denotes the value of its fixed component. In equation (31), denotes
the stochastic component of the foreign price which is assumed to be dis-
tributed normally with zero mean and a fixed known variance. Using (31) for
log P yields
(32) log P log S +logF'
In principle, the random component of P, may also include stochastic
deviations from the purchasing power parity relation of equation (32). When
all shocks are zero, the domestic price is:
(32') log P =logS0 +logF'25
and subtracting (32') from (32) yields
(33)
where,as before, we suppress the time subscripts.
The nominal rate of interest is linked to the foreign rate of
interest, i' Arbitrage by investors, who are assumed to be risk neutral,
assures that uncovered interest parity holds:
+E(logS÷1 —logS)
where Et log S÷ denotes the expected exchange rate for period t+1
based on the information available at period t .Theforeign rate of inter-
est is also subject to a random shock, p ,whichis distributed normally
with zero mean and a fixed known variance. Thus,
(35) i =-' + Pt
The specification of the stochastic shocks imply that the expected exchange
rate for period t+l is S (the level obtained in the absence of shocks)
and, therefore, E(lo S1 —logS) =— s•Thus, using equations (3k)-
(35),it follows that
(36) i -1' =
10
In the absence of stochastic shocks i=i' and, therefore,
(29') log Mdlog Klog P0 +log26
Subtracting (29') from (29), omitting the time subscript and recalling that
from (33)sp—yields
(37) md(l+a)p+y -
Thesupply of money (or more precisely, the percentage deviation of
the supply of money from its non—stochastic level) is denoted by m.
Monetary equilibrium is obtained when the demand for money equals the
supply. We turn next to an analysis of the optimal money supply.
IV.2 Optimal Monetary Policy
The analysis of section Ii derived the optimal wage—indexation rule.
In this section we focus on the determinants of a money—supply rule that is
designed to achieve the same goal of elinimating labor-market disequili-
brium. In order to determine the optimal money supply and to contrast the
results with those of the previous sections, we assume that wages are com-
pletely unindexed so that wO. The question that is being addressed con-
cerns the optimal response of monetary policy in the face of exogeneously
given shocks. This question is not new. It was addressed by various
authors in the context of the energy supply shocks of the 197Os.h1 The key
question was whether monetary policy should be accommodative and expend the
money supply in order to "finance" the higher energy price or whether it
should be anti—accommodative and contract the money supply in order to lower
inflation. It has of course been recognized that a real shock which lowers
the potential level of output can not be combated successfully by monetary
policy. The question was whether monetary policy could be designed so as to
prevent the additional costs arising from departures from the new (lower)
level of potential output. In what follows we reexamine this question.27
In order to determine the optimal money supply we first equate the
dernanO for money md (from 37) with the supply m and, by using equation
(10) for the equilibrium level of output, we obtain the equilibrium price
level p:
(38) =4; Lm + (x)
(1+dça
From equation (9) it is evident that when w=0 (as is the case when
nominal wages are unindexed), the value of p which yields the equilibrium
real wage and thereby eliminates labor market disequilibrium is
0 (9')p=— u
C+fl
Equatingthe value of p which clears the money market (from equation (38))
withthe corresponding value of p which clears the labor market (from
equation (9')) and solving for cn yields the optimal monetary rule
(39) rn- a(p)+[(1d(1)]o(-Aq)
where .i-Aq has been substituted for the effective real shock u.
Inspection of equation (39) reveals that when the income elasticity
of the demand for money, ,isunity, while the elasticity of the supply of
labor, c, and the (semi) interest elasticity of the demand for money, x, are
zero then m =0.This is the case analysed in detail by Fischer (1985). In
this special case the price generated by the condition of money market
equilibrium is precisely the price needed to yield the equilibrium real wage
and, therefore, no accommodation is necessary. In fact, any attempt to
alter the money supply in response to the supply shock would result in28
suboptimal employment and would inflict welfare loss.In general, however,
as long as a or c differ from zero and differs from unity, there is
room for active monetary policy.12
In interpreting the rule specified by (39)wenote that a positive
foreign interest rate shock, p, as well as a positive foreign price shock,
xlowerthe demand for money; the interest shock operates through its
direct effect on the Qomestic rate of interest while the price shock
operates through its impact on exchange rate expectations. Wneri both shocks
are present, their impact is to reduce the demand for money by
The proper response should reduce the money supply by the same amount and,
thereby, prevent further spill—overs of the effects of these shocks to other
segments of the economy. The second term on the right-hand-side of equation
(39)specifythe optimal response to shocks to productivity, ,andto the
imported energy price, q. Both of these shocks alter the equilibrium level
of output and result in a new equilibrium real wage. In addition, the new
equilibrium level of output alters the demand for money. Without changes in
the money supply, the conditions of money market equilibrium yield a new
price level and, thereby, a new real wage. As shown in equation (39) the
induced change in the real wage will be Just sufficient to restore labor
market equilibrium only if (1c) equals (1+a). In general, a rise in the
price of imported energy should induce an expansionary monetary policy if
(1+a) >(1+c),and vice versa. it is also relevant to note that in gene-
ral the optimal monetary response to the effective real shock depends on the
relative share of imported energy in output. A higher value of the energy
share, A, raises the (absolute value of) the optimal response.
The preceeding analysis demonstrated that when wages are unindexed
monetary policy could be designed to ensure labor market equilibrium.
Furthermore, it was shown that when =1 and caO monetary policy should29
not accommodate supply shocks. Prior to concluding this section it is worth
reexamining these results for situations in which wages are indexed accord-
ing to an arbitrary rule by which w =b0p.Recalling the equilibrium real
wage from equation (9) and using the assumed inuexation rule, yields the




Following the same procedure as before we equate this price with the price





Two points are worth noting with reference to equation (39').
First, in contrast with the discussion of equation (39) where nominal wages
were unindexed, here even if =1 and c=a=O,rn does not equal zero, and
a real shock calls for an active monetary response. In that case the
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Thus, with a partial wage indexation a rise in the price of energy and a
negative productivity shock require an expansionary monetary policy.
Second, with one important exception, the welfare cost induced by
the choice of a sub-optimal value of b0 could be eliminated through the
monetary rule prescribed by equation (39'). The important exception occurs30
when b is set arbitrarily to equal unity. In that case the indexation rule
prevents changes in the real wage and results in an absolute real—wage
rigidity. Therefore, any real shock that alters the equilibrium real wage
results in labor market disequilibrium arid inouces welfare cost. Monetary
policy can not reduce this cost.
IV.3 Alternative Monetary Rules
The preceeding discussion specified the optimal money-supply rule.
In practice, various alternative rules for monetary targets have been pro-
posed, with special attention given recently to the proposal that monetary
policy targets nominal income.1 In this section we apply the analytical
framework to the evaluation of alternative proposals. For this purpose we
substitute equation (6') for y into the demand for money (equation (37))




Considerfirst a monetary rule that targets the CPI. With such a
rule prOinequation (37'), and the resulting money supply is
(40) —ou—c(px)
Thismonetary rule assures that prO and, in the absence of wage indexa—
tion, the real wage is stabilized. The welfare loss associated with CPI
targeting is the same as the loss resulting from a full indexation of wages31
to the CPI since both stabilize the real wage. This loss is specified in
equation (19).
Consider next the monetary rule which targets nominal income. Witri
sucn a rule p÷y=O. In this case, using equation (6'), the value of output
is you/(1o). Substituting into equation (37') and recalling that p—y,
the resulting money supply is
(1) m= u= 1—A
In order to evaluate the lfare loss associated with this monetary rule we
note that in this case, with w=O, the real wage (w-p) equals yand,
using (6') y=L1/(1—A)ju .Withthis real wage the level of employment
remains unchanged (as seen from equation (14')) and, therefore, the resulting
welfare loss is specified in equation (23).
Consider next a third monetary rule which targets the domestic
value—added price index. With this rule d0 and, using the definition of'
form (214), it follows that p[A/(1— A)jq .Substitutinginto (37')
the resulting money supply is
(142) - Aq
-
Withthis targeting rule and with unindexed wages, w=PdO and the result-
ing welfare loss is specified by equation (26).
Tne equivalence between the measures of the welfare cost associated
with the targeting rules for monetary policy and the iridexation rules for
nominal wages implies that the welfare rankings of the various rules is also32




and, if > n ,thewelfare ranking is
(143')rnrn rn
pO dO fp+yo
It is interesting to note that the ranking provided by (3) is also
consistent with that in Tobin (1983) where the targeting of nominal income
(with annual revisions) is supported and the targeting of price indexes is
criticizea. However, in discussing the choice between targeting p and
targeting d Tobin concludes that
"...ifany price index were to be a policy
target, it should surely not be the CPI,
subject as that index is to fluctuations from
specific commodity prices, taxes, exchange
rates, import costs, interest rates, and other
idiosynoracies. It should be some index of
domestic value added at factor cost, [Tobin
(1983, p. 119)].
Our analysis shows that this ranking is not robust. As revealed by the
comparison of (143) with (143'), the ranking of the various alternatives
depends on the relative magnitudes of the elasticities of the demand and the
supply of labor.
In this section we have considered three specific targeting rules.
A similar procedure can be applied to the evaluation of other rules like
targeting the exchange rate (e.g., setting sO), targeting the interest rate
(e.g., setting i—i' =0)targeting the money supply (e.g., setting m=O), or33
Hall's(1984) "elastic price rule". Each of these alternatives inflicts
welfare cost but, in general, the welfare ranking of the various rules
depends on the values of the pirameters. It can be shown, however, that
(414) in)m>.m -
pO s-O i—i'—O
Thus, in the present model, a monetary rule that targets the CPI produces
smaller welfare costs than a rule that targets the exchange rate which, in
turn, has smaller costs than a rulethattargets the rate of interest.
Furthermore, in the special case for which c=O ,thetargeting of nominal
GNP is optimal and, therefore, it dominates the other policy rules including
the constant money—growth rule.
Finally, it Is relevant to note that when there are no real shocks
so thatqyO ,then, In this special case all of the
targeting rules (including the optimal rule, m )yieldidentical money—
supply response. This response ensures that the real wage remains intact,
that changes in the money supply exactly offset shocks—induced changes in
the money demand, and that the welfare cost is eliminated.
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we analysed the interactions among supply shocks, wage
indexation and monetary policy. We developed an analytical framework for
the determination of optimal wage indexation and monetary policy. This
framework was then applied to the analysis of the implications of sub—
optimal policy rules. The welfare ranking of these rules was based on the
relative magnitudes of the dead-weight losses associated with the various3L
policies.The main results of our analysis are summarized in the introduc-
tion to this paper. In what follows we outline some of the limitations and
further extentions.
In our framework labor-market contracts stipulate the nominal wage
rule for the length of the contract period. These contracts reflect the
cost of negotiations. Since the wage rule is set in advance of the realiza-
tion of tne stochastic shocks, it may give rise to dead-weight losses as-
sociated with disequilibrium real wages. Our analysis employs this specific
form of wage contracts as a stylized description of conventional labor—
market arrangements. Implicit in our formulation is the assumption that
workers and employers are risk neutral. A useful extension would allow for
risk aversion which would rationalize contracts in terms of the insurance
function Lsee, for example, Azarariadis (1978)J
Further, in our specification the welfare loss arises only from sub—
optimal employment level. Implicit in this specification is the assmumption
that all other markets are undistorteu. An extension would allow for other
distortions. In that case the welfare loss due to sub-optimal money
holdings would be added to the loss associated with labor—market distortions
and would depend on both the level and the variance of inflation.
While we have assumed In the main analysis that the stochastic
shocks are identically and independently distributed with a zero mean and a
fixed variance, we have outlined the way by which one could allow for more
general time—series properties of the stochastic shocks. An explicit
elaboration of such on extension would highlight the important distinction
between permanent and transitory shocks, and would generate a profile of
wage cynamics. Richer and more complicated dynamics could also be induced
by staggered contracts and by capital accumulation [see, for example,
Fischer (1977c,1985) and Taylor (1980)J.35
Our analysis assumed that there is one composite good which is
traded internationally at a (stochastically) given world price. With this
level of aggregation we demonstrated that wage—indexation rules bear an
exact dual relation to monetary—targeting rules. This duality implied that
there was no fundamental difference between the outcomes of various wage-
indexatiori rules and the outcomes of the corresponding monetary—targeting
rules. Tnerefore, when there is a single composite commodity the choice
between wage indexation and monetary policy is governed by additional
considerations like the relative costs and complexities associated with the
implementation of the two alternatives rules. In the more general case,
however, when there are many sectors producing a variety of goods, the exact
duality between wage indexation and monetary policy breaks down.
Specifically, as shown by Blinder and Mankiw (19814), it is clear that
monetary policy, being an aggregative policy, is not suitable for dealing
with sector-specific shocks. Under such circumstances it is evident that
optimal sector-specific policies are called for. A natural extension of our
analysis would apply the analytical framework to the determination of the
optimal sector-specific wage—indexation formulae that would eliminate the
welfare loss resulting from labor-market distortions.36
APPENDIX
The Computation of the Welfare Loss
In this Appendix we provide a formal derivation of' the welfare loss
that is used in the text.




where designates the subjective discount factor, C. and L1 (1=1,2)
denote the levels of' consumption and labor in period iand where the
subscripts 1 and 2 designate periods 1 and 2 respectively. The value of
assets which are not consumed in period 1 is A1and their value in period
2 is (i÷r)A1 where r designates the exogenously given (stochastic) world
rate of interest on internationally traded bonds. Profits are denoted by R
and are assumed to be redistributed as lump—sum transfers. The value of
profits in each period is the corresponding value of output, minus




where W, Pand P denote the nominal wage, the price of energy and the
price of output, respectively. Producers are assumed to maximize profits37
subject to the given real wage and the given relative price of energy. In
equilibrium the real wage and the relative price of energy are equated to
the marginal products of labor and energy, respectively.
— Y(L,V)-w (A3) aL -
- Y(L,V)- (A ) -p--
Theseconditions yield the demands for labor and energy inputs. The
brium real wage that clears the labor market is defined by (W/P) and L
and V denote the corresponding equilibrium levels of employment and energy
utilization. At this general equilibrium all markets clear.
We turn now to the formal maximization problem starting with the
maximization of second period utility. Denoting by R1 (i1,2) the solution
to the producers' profit maximization problem in period i as implied by








The solution to this problem yields C2 and L2 as the optimal values of
consumption and labor supply in period 2. These optimal values are condi—
tional, of course, on the historically given value of A1 Thus, we can
define a function u(A1) which denotes the expected value of second
period's optimal utility. Thus, u(A1) =E[u(C;L;)]
.Themaximization
problem for period 1 can then be presented as:38




where Q denotes the given initial endowment. The solution to (A—6) yields
the optimal values C1 ,L1and A1 .Forsubsequent use we note that the
optimal value of A1is chosen so as to satisfy the first order condition
requiring that
(A-7) u(A )/A1 au(C1 ,L1 )/C1
The value of utility in the general equilibrium is denoted by U(L1)
where it is understood that this level of utility is obtained when C1 L1
and A1 are set at their unconstrained optimal values C1 ,L1 and A1 .In
practice, due to contracts, the level of employment might be constrained to
L1
.Theresulting level of utility would be U(L1) where it is understood
that C1 and A1are still chosen optimally subject to the constraint that
the maximization of profits and the given nominal wage yield labor demand
(and therefore employment) at the level L1 .Thewelfare cost of the




where U =U(L1)-U(L1)and where 0 =u(C1,L1)/C1denotes first
period's marginal utility of consumption evaluated around the general equi—
ii b r i urn.39
In order to obtain an expression measuring the welfare loss we first
compute the change in welfare associated with a marginal change in employ-
ment around an initial arbitrary level L .Inwhat follows we compute the
welfare cost for period 1 and we suppress the corresponding time
subscript.Using equation (A—6), the first order approximation of the change
in welfare resulting from a marginal change in employment is
*
(A—9)U(LL)—U(L) =[.u(C,L)/aCiAC+[au(C,L)/L)iL+[au(A)/AJ.AA
Using equation (A—fl and expressing (A—9) in terms of first period
consumption yields
(A-b) U(L+L)-U(L)=- ()AL+A
where (W/P)5=—au(C,L)/L denotes the real wage as measured along the
supply of labor. From the definition of profits in (A—2) and the budget
constraint in (A—6) we note that
C +A-Q=Y(L,V)-
and,therefore,
(A-li) +A= + —
Sinceproduces always maximize profits, we may substitute the first order
conditions (A—3)—(A—A4) into (A—il) to obtain40
CAb') C +A=
where(W/P)d denotes the real wage as measured along the demand for labor.








In computing the welfare loss we note that
U(L1) -U(L1) _dL






Finally, assuming a constant marginal utility of consumption (i.e. assuming
risk neutrality), (A—12) can be written as
(A—13') f1 wd w41
In order to obtain a more useful expression for the welfare loss we first
express ()and()interms of the elasticities of supply and demand
for labor. Using the definitions of elasticities the values of ()and








whereAL =L—L,andwheree and n denote the elasticities of the
supply and the demand for labor. Substituting into (A—13') yields
(A-H) =j1((I + I) (L-L)dL
L1
L
Integrating the expression in (A—H) yields
(A-15) =() (
+1)(LL)
The loss function H is the expected value of (A—15). Denoting by c and
Lthe equilibrium levels of output and employment obtained in the absence
of stochastic shocks, we note that








Wealso note that from the first order condition
()L == BY(1÷y)
Substituting these expressions into (A—15), ignoring terms higher than




Finally, substituting equation (11) of the text for (i—i) yields the loss
function
(A—17) H =n--(I+ I) {—(w—p)+(W:p)]2}
whereH is the approximation to .Theexpression in (A—17)
is the expected value of equation (13) in the text.43
FOOTNOTES
1This assumption is relaxed in Aizenman and Frenkel (1985) where it is
assumed (in the context of a model without energy) that the value of the
stochastic shock is not known at each point in time. In that case, behavior is
governec by the conditional expectations of the shocks based on the available
information.
2The question concerning the efficiency of the assumed wage contract is
addressed in section 11.2, footnote 6.
3mis expression corresponsd to equation (A—VT) in the Appendix. in order
+- 4-k..-. ,- ..-'-,-4 +--. ,,,,i4-,r,], #-4,-.- (1)\ ) .JLJ .Ljj ILLL LU L414J L.. %J W LU '.J
bythe equilibrium (non—stochastic) wage bill (W/P)0L0. For a useful discussion
of the measurement of the welfare cost see Harberger (1971).
It is assumed that the initial contractual nominalwage is set at
the level that would have prevailed in equilibrium in the absence of shocks.
Any other initial wage would not minimize the expected value ofthewelfare
loss. In making this statement we use the approximation
Ut- logEt_i(e
) —Et_.(ut). This approximation is valid for small values of the
variance and the realization of the stochastic shock u.
5For an analysis of optimal indexation rules see Fischer (1977a, 1977b).
6The assumption that employment is determined by the demand for labor was
challenged by Cukierman (1980) who examined alternative specifications. As is
evident with optimal policies, these issues turn inconsequential since, at the
optimum, there is an equality between the demand and the supply of labor.
Likewise, at the optimum the conceptual difficulties raised by Barro (1977)
concerning the existence of suboptimal contracts, are also inconsequential since
with optimal policies these contracts are in fact optimal. For a further
discussion and rationalization of such contracts see Hall and Lazear (1984), and
Fischer (1977b).
7The specification in (17) constrained the coefficient ofp to be unity.
More formally let the coefficient of p in (17) be b; in that case the real
wage is w—p =(b—i)+by,and the level of output (using 6') is
y =1(b—1)P
+ouJ/(1+ub).Substituting this expression into the real—wage
equation and using equation (13) reveals that in order to equate the realized
real wage with the equilibrium real wage, the coefficient of p must be unity
and the coefficient of y must be /(1+€). It is also relevant to note that44
equation (17') corresponds to equation (15) in Karni (1983, p. 286). The
precise analogy may not be apparent due to a typo-graphical error in Karril's
equation(15).Using Karni's notations his coefficient of indexation to real
output is /(w+ówa).
8Foranalysesof alternative proposals see Fischer (1977a) Eden (1979)
Marston and Turnovsky (1983) and Marston (1984). For an analysis of alternative
compensation systems and for a related discussion of employment versus real wage
stabilization, see Weitzman (1983).
91t is relevant to note that with aCobb-Douglas production function
indexing nominal wages to nominal income is equivalent to indexing real wages to
the realvalue of value added in terms of units offinal output. To verify,
definethereal value added by Y—(P/P)V and the percentage change thereof is:
— (q+v).From the first—order conditions ÀY/V =P/Pand, therefore,
yq+v. It follows therefore that - y=y.Marston and Turnovsky (1983)
argue that the rule according towhich nominal wages are indexed to the value-
addedprice index produces equivalent results to the rule by which real wages
are indexed to real GNP. Our analysis shows that this equivalence holds only as
long as there are no productivity shocks. Further, if the two rules are
equivalent then they will be optimal only if, in addition, €=O.
10The implicit assumption underlying this formulation is that all
variables are stationary, i.e., that there are no trends, and that Et log
is not influenced by the observed price. Therefore, in the absence of shocks,
i=i' .Ourassumption about the absence of trend allows us to focus on the
properties of the stationary equilibrium for which the current values of the
stochastic shocks do not affet the expectations about future values of the
variables. In general, the stochastic shocks need not be identically and
independently distributed with zero mean and a fixed variance. Allowing for a
more general specification requires a modification of the definition of the
bench-mark equilibrium that is obtained in the absence of shocks. With a more
general specification of the stochastic shocks we let lower-case letters denote
an innovation of a given variable. Thus, x =logX -Et_ilog X instead of
the specification which is adopted in the text according to whichx =logX -
logX. Obviously, in the special case discussed in the text, the assumed
properties of the stochastic shocks Imply that Et_i log X =logX0. with this
interpretation of x (as the innovation of log Xe), the analysis can allow
for trends in the various series and the various stocks may include permanent45
and transitory components. It is also relevant to note that the specification
of equation (36) also embodies the assumption that the equilibrium is unique.
The choice of the unique equilibrium is consistent with the criterion suggested
by McCallum (1983). On the issue of uniqueness see Calvo (1970) and Turnovsky
(1983).
11Relevant early references are Gordon (1975) and Phelps (1978). The
focus on the question of accommodation in the presence of supply shocks is
contained in Blinder (1981), Gordon (19814), and Fischer (1985), and various
structural issues concerning adjustment to external shocks in an international
setting are found in Bruno (19814), Bruno and Sachs (1982), Findlay and Rodriguez
(1977), and Marion and Svensson (1982).
12Phelps (1978) emphasizes the implications of an income elasticity
differing from unity.
131n the more general specification of the stochastic shocks (which was
described in footnote (10)), the term (px) in equation (37) would be replaced
by th innovation in i, +log which can also be expressed as







where p =logP — logP .Inorder to obtain this expression for the
innovation we first substitute equation (314) into the demand for money (equation
(29)), and replace i'(in equation (29')) with Et_ii .Subtractingthe
resulting two equations from each other yields the more general expression
corresponding to equation (37).
114For an analysis of nominal-income targeting see Meade (1978), Poole
(1980), Tobin (1980, 1983), Hall (1983), Bean (1983) and Taylor (1985). For
discussions of a close variant of nominal-income targeting see McCallum (19814)
and Mishkin (19814), and for other rules see Phelps and Taylor (1977).46
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